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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that ownership influences self-perceptions and behaviors. According 
to dominant theories in this area, a key to understanding the effects of ownership is the mental 
association between the owner and the owned object. However, little is known about the 
formation of such associations. Drawing on principles of associative network theories, the 
present research investigated the effects of two types of ownership situations, mere-ownership 
and ownership-by-choice, on implicit self-object linking (i.e., the behavior of automatically 
connecting a person’s self and a given object on an implicit measure). In Study 1, mere-
ownership influenced implicit self-object linking for positive, but not for negative, objects. In 
Study 2, ownership of negative objects influenced implicit self-object linking in ownership-by-
choice but not mere-ownership situations. Studies 3 to 5 replicated the effect of ownership-by-
choice on implicit self-object linking for negative objects and further demonstrated its 
independence of pre-existing differences in relevant object properties, ownership expectations, 
and physical ownership. The findings are discussed with reference to existing theories and 
research on associative representation, decision-making and choice, and the self.  
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When Possessions Become Part of the Self:  
Ownership and Implicit Self-object Linking 
Do you remember your experience when you got to own your first toy, your first trophy, 
or your first house? What did the experience feel like? The psychological experience of 
ownership has profound implications for human behavior. On one hand, the gain and loss of 
ownership are realized through behaviors such as working and trading. On the other hand, 
ownership influences behaviors towards the possessions. For example, people prefer things they 
own (Beggan, 1992), attribute human characteristics to material objects (Epley, Waytz, & 
Cacioppo, 2007), develop trust and loyalty to brands (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001), and get 
emotionally attached to their possessions (Frost & Hartl, 1996).  
A long-standing view about ownership is that it constitutes a relation between the 
owner’s self and his or her possessions. William James defined the self as the “sum of things that 
the person calls his or hers” (James, 1890, p. 291). Social-identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) 
and symbolic self-completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981) propose that objects, such 
as possessions, contribute to the symbolic definition of a person’s identity and the 
communication of this identity to other people. Research on conspicuous consumption (Pettit & 
Sivanathan, 2011) suggests that possessions contribute greatly to one’s public self-image. 
Consistent with these views, Belk (1988) argued that a person’s possessions should be viewed as 
extensions of a person’s self, as they help the person maintain a sense of continuity and a sense 
of the past.  
Recent developments in implicit social cognition and the prominence of associative 
network theories in this area (for an overview, see Gawronski & Payne, 2010) provide 
researchers with a new approach to studying the relation between the owner’s self and his or her 
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possessions. According to this approach, the proposed relation can be understood as a mental 
association between the owner’s self and the owned object in an associative network of social 
knowledge (Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002). To the extent that 
self-object associations are sufficiently strong, they can have automatic effects on behavior, 
including responses that automatically connect the self and the object on implicit measures (cf. 
Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014). Following terminological conventions proposed by De Houwer, 
Gawronski, and Barnes-Holmes (2013), we use the term implicit self-object linking to describe 
the behavioral phenomenon of automatically connecting the self and a given object on an 
implicit measure, and the term self-object association to describe a particular mental construct 
that is proposed to explain this behavioral phenomenon. From this perspective, ownership may 
influence implicit self-object linking by forming (or strengthening) a mental association between 
the owner’s self and the owned object. 
The main goal of the present research is to (1) examine the effect of ownership on 
implicit self-object linking and (2) identify its boundary conditions on the basis of principles 
proposed by associative network theories. By doing so, we hope to achieve a better 
understanding of the psychological processes and representational structures underlying 
ownership effects. Toward this end, we will first outline the theoretical framework that guided 
our research. We will then present five experimental studies, in which we tested key predictions 
from the theoretical framework. Finally, the findings will be discussed with reference to previous 
work on the psychology of ownership, the self, and associative network theories of social 
cognition.  
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An Associative Approach to Ownership 
The idea that ownership leads to a mental association between the owner’s self and the 
owned object was originally proposed by Beggan (1992) in his work on the mere-ownership 
effect. Across several studies, participants reported enhanced positive evaluations of an object 
after they received the object as a gift (compared to before they received the object). The term 
mere-ownership was justified by the setting that the objects individuals received were randomly 
selected from a larger set of similar objects. Similarly, the endowment effect (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990) shows that the ownership of objects increases the perceived value of 
the objects for the owners. Similar effects have also been observed on implicit evaluations 
(Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007; Huang, Wang, & Shi, 2009).  
According to Beggan (1992), the key to understanding the mere-ownership effect is the 
mental association between the owner’s self and the owned object, as it allows the positive post-
ownership evaluation of the owned object to transfer to the self, and thereby function as a means 
of self-enhancement. On a similar note, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) argued that a mental 
association between a concept and a person’s self should allow for the automatic transfer of 
valence from the concept to the self or from the self to the concept. From this perspective, the 
mere-ownership effect is an instance of what Greenwald and Banaji called implicit self-esteem 
effects: the automatic transfer of positive valence from the self to a concept associated with the 
self. Consistent with this notion, Gawronski et al. (2007) found that participants’ implicit 
evaluation of a chosen object, but not that of a rejected object, depended on participants’ implicit 
evaluations of the self. Similar effects have been observed for 5 year-old children (Cvencek, 
Greenwald, & Meltzoff, 2016) and for the relation between implicit evaluations of the self and 
implicit evaluations of ingroups (e.g., Roth & Steffens, 2014).  
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Greenwald et al. (2002) proposed that such mental associations are part of a larger 
associative network consisting of interconnected conceptual nodes that are centered around a 
node representing the self (see Figure 1). Associative links allow for automatic spread of 
activation between nodes, in that the activation of one node automatically leads to the activation 
of associated nodes. The strength of associations can therefore be understood as the ease with 
which activation spreads from one node to another. According to this view, the association 
between the owner’s self and the owned object is a specific case of a general type of association 
between the self and other concepts. To the extent that such mental associations play a key role 
in other social psychological phenomena, such as self-esteem, group attitudes, and stereotypes 
(Greenwald et al., 2002), understanding the effects of ownership on the formation of self-object 
associations is important not only for understanding the psychology of ownership, but also for 
gaining deeper insights into other key phenomena in social psychology.  
A Theory of Self-Object Association 
Most existing models of association formation have focused on the effects of repeated co-
occurrence between two stimuli as a source of mental associations (e.g., De Houwer, Thomas, & 
Baeyens, 2001). Ownership, however, goes beyond the co-occurrence of the owner’s self and the 
owned object, in that it involves a meaningful event in which the owner forms a relation with the 
owned object. Balanced-identity theory (Cvencek, Greenwald, & Meltzoff, 2012; Greenwald et 
al., 2002) suggests that such events should lead to adaptive changes in people’s associative 
networks in the form of new associations that reflect the experience. Accordingly, newly 
established ownership should pressure a person’s associative network to form a new association 
between the person’s self and the newly owned object.  
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The theory further suggests that the formation of associations under the pressure of new 
experience is constrained by two principles of associative networks. The principle of balance-
congruity states that, if each of two nodes is linked to the same third node, the two nodes have a 
“shared first-order link” (Greenwald et al., 2002, p. 6), which facilitates the formation of a new 
association between the two nodes. The principle of imbalance-dissonance states that the 
associative network should resist forming a new association between two nodes, if such an 
association would result in each of the two nodes being linked to two bipolar-opposed nodes, 
defined as nodes with “fewer shared first-order links than expected by chance” (Greenwald et al., 
2002, p. 6). Examples of bipolar-opposed nodes can be seen in the associative structure depicted 
in Figure 1, including the nodes representing positive and negative valence and the nodes 
representing male and female.  
On the basis of these two principles, one can predict whether the formation of a new self-
object association should be facilitated or inhibited in ownership situations by examining the 
associative network structure that includes the self, the object, and the third nodes to which the 
self and the object are associated. In the example here, we use positive and negative valence as 
the focal bipolar-opposed nodes. Assuming that both the self and the object are associated with 
positive valence (i.e., a shared first-order link), the balance-congruity principle implies that the 
formation of a new self-object association should be facilitated. However, if the self is associated 
with positive valence and the object is associated with negative valence (i.e., links to two 
bipolar-opposed nodes), the conjunction of the two principles implies that the formation of a new 
self-object association should be inhibited. If a self-object association would be formed in the 
latter case, it would lead to (1) an association between the self and negative valence via their 
shared first-order link to the object, and (2) an association between the object and positive 
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valence via their shared first-order link to the self. As a result, the self and the object would be 
associated with both positive and negative valence. Yet, according to the imbalance-dissonance 
principle, the associative network should resist forming associations with two bipolar opposite 
nodes.  
In the present research, we use the term self-object congruity to describe the degree to 
which the self and the object share common third nodes. The content of these shared nodes may 
vary widely, including general features (e.g., positive valence) as well as specific features (e.g., 
fashionable) that are part of the representation of both the object and the self (e.g., a fashionable 
product for someone who sees herself as fashionable). Correspondingly, we use the term self-
object incongruity to describe the degree to which the self and the object are each associated with 
one of two bipolar-opposed nodes, one of which is part of the representation of the object (e.g., a 
product with an unfashionable design) while the other is part of an individual’s self (e.g., 
someone who sees herself as fashionable). It follows from the above analysis that, whereas 
higher degrees of self-object congruity should facilitate the formation of self-object association 
(see Figure 2), higher degrees of self-object incongruity should inhibit the formation of self-
object association (see Figure 3).  
Ownership Situations 
Two common types of ownership situations have been examined in previous research. In 
mere-ownership situations (e.g., Beggan, 1992), ownership results from a factor that is not under 
the owner’s control. In experimental studies, it is typically realized by random procedures, such 
as the experimenter rolling a dice or flipping a coin, which determine the object to be received by 
the owners (e.g., as a gift). In what we call ownership-by-choice situations (Brehm, 1956; Shultz, 
Léveillé, & Lepper, 1999; Gawronski et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2009), ownership results from a 
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factor that is under the owner’s control. That is, individuals are allowed to freely choose the 
object that they would like to own from multiple alternatives. According to research on cognitive 
dissonance (Brehm, 1956; Festinger, 1957, 1964; for reviews, see Chen & Risen, 2010; Harmon-
Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008), individuals with free choice tend to 
report stronger preferences for chosen over rejected objects after they make their choice, as 
compared to before they make their choice (i.e. spreading-of-alternatives effect). This effect has 
also been observed on implicit evaluations and implicit self-object linking (Gawronski et al., 
2007).  
Previous research (e.g., Brehm, 1956; Huang et al., 2009) has attempted to dissociate the 
effect of choice and that of ownership and found that choice has a stronger impact on object 
evaluations than ownership. A potential reason for this is that choice fulfils important 
psychological functions, such as self-affirmation and self-verification (Huang et al., 2009). 
Consistent with this view, some researchers (e.g., Chan, Karbowski, Monty, & Perlmuter, 1986; 
Tafarodi, Mehranvar, Panton, & Milne, 2002) suggested that choice leads to an elevated sense of 
control, feeling of autonomy, and enhanced levels of engagement.  
More important for the present research, choice involves cognitive processing of 
information about the alternative objects, which may have implications for the formation of self-
object associations. Such information processing may occur at two stages. Before the choice, 
individuals engage in pre-decision processing, which involves comparing all choice alternatives 
along a series of focal aspects and eliminate unfavorable alternatives until there is a favorite 
option (Tversky, 1972). Consequently, positive features of the favored alternative as well as 
negative features of the disliked alternatives are made salient. After the choice, individuals tend 
to show an enhanced preference for chosen over rejected objects even when the available options 
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have been evaluated equally before the decision (Brehm, 1954; Jecker, 1964; for a review, see 
Chen & Risen, 2010). Such spreading-of-alternatives effects have been attributed to biased post-
decision processing, involving a selective focus on positive features of the chosen alternative and 
negative features of the rejected alternatives in order to reduce post-decisional dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957, 1964; Harmon-Jones et al., 2008). 
To the extent that (1) the desirable features of an object can be viewed as shared nodes 
between the owner’s self and an object and (2) undesirable features of an object can be viewed as 
opposed nodes to nodes associated with the owner’s self, both pre- and post- decision processing 
should enhance the levels of self-object congruity for the chosen object and self-object 
incongruity for the rejected object. This should further facilitate the formation of self-object 
associations for chosen objects as compared to rejected objects in ownership-by-choice situations. 
However in mere-ownership situations, due to the lack of control over the outcome, the owners 
are unlikely to engage in any forms of pre-ownership and post-ownership processing that are 
similar to the pre-decision and post-decision processing discussed above. In this case, the 
formation of self-object associations should be primarily driven by situational pressure from the 
experience of mere-ownership.  
Object Valence 
We further propose that the formation of self-object associations should be constrained by 
pre-existing object properties involving self-object congruity and incongruity, and more so in the 
mere-ownership situation than in the ownership-by-choice situation. In the present research, we 
focused on one of the most basic object properties: object valence. To the extent that the self is 
associated with positive valence (Cvencek, Greenwald, & Meltzoff, 2016; Sedikides, Gaertner, 
& Cai, 2015; see also Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 
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2001), objects of positive or negative valence have pre-existing levels of self-object congruity or 
incongruity, respectively. Thus, in mere-ownership situations, where the formation of self-object 
associations is constrained by situational pressures, the process should be facilitated for positive 
objects and inhibited for negative objects. In contrast, in ownership-by-choice situations, where 
the formation of self-object associations is driven by changes in the levels of self-object 
congruity due to decision-related information processing, the proposed moderation by object 
valence should be attenuated or absent.  
A review of previous research suggests that little is known about the effect of object 
valence in ownership. To our knowledge, all studies on mere-ownership effects included objects 
of either positive valence (e.g., monetary token and coffee mug in Kahneman et al., 1990; 
chocolate and candy in Huang et al., 2009; pleasant postcards in Gawronski et al., 2007) or 
neutral valence (e.g., cold drink insulator in Beggan, 1992; colored flags in Cvencek et al., 2016). 
Similarly, most studies on choice effects included alternatives of positive valence (e.g., consumer 
electronics in Brehm, 1956; see also Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). The only exception is a study by Shultz et al. (1999), where participants were 
asked to choose between two posters that were judged as less desirable than average among a 
total of eight posters. Yet, the alternatives in this study were not unpleasant in absolute terms 
(see Shultz et al., 1999, Note 5). Thus, little empirical work has been done on the effects of 
ownership and choice for negative objects, and we aimed to shed light on these issues with the 
present research.  
Overview of Present Research 
In sum, we argue that ownership effects are mediated by the formation of a new mental 
association between the owner’s self and the newly owned object. Drawing on two principles of 
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balanced identity theory (Cvencek et al., 2012; Greenwald et al., 2002), we propose that the 
formation of self-object associations depends on the levels of self-object congruity and self-
object incongruity, which should be determined by pre-existing properties of the object in mere-
ownership situations and by choice-related information processing in ownership-by-choice 
situations. Hence, the formation of self-object associations should be attenuated by pre-existing 
object properties involving self-object incongruity (e.g., negative valence) in mere-ownership 
situations, but not in ownership-by-choice situations.  
Study 1 tested the prediction that, in mere-ownership situations, ownership effects on 
implicit self-object linking should occur for positive, but not negative, objects. Studies 2 and 3 
tested the prediction that ownership effects on implicit self-object linking should occur for 
negative objects in ownership-by-choice, but not mere-ownership, situations. In Study 4, we 
tested the prediction that contextual factors influencing the degrees of pre- and post-decision 
processing in ownership-by-choice situations should moderate the degree of ownership effects 
on implicit self-object linking for negative objects. Finally in Study 5, we examined the 
independent impacts of pre- and post-decision processing on the effects of choice on implicit 
self-object linking.  
Study 1 
The main goals of Study 1 were (1) to examine the effect of mere-ownership on implicit 
self-object linking and (2) to test the predicted moderation by object valence in mere-ownership 
situations. To provide further evidence for the proposed transfer of valence from the owner’s self 
to the owned object (e.g., Gawronski et al., 2007), we also tested the effect of ownership on 
implicit evaluations of owned and non-owned objects. Toward this end, participants gained 
ownership of an object that was randomly selected from two similar alternatives of either 
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positive or negative valence. Afterwards, participants completed measures of implicit self-object 
linking with, as well as implicit evaluations of, the owned object and the non-owned object.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 156 participants1 (124 women, 32 men) from the 
subject pool of the Department of Psychology at the University of Western Ontario participated 
for research credit. The study used a 2 (Object Valence: positive vs. negative, between-Ss) × 2 
(Object Status: owned vs. non-owned, within-Ss) × 2 (Order of Measures: implicit self-object 
linking first vs. implicit evaluation first, between-Ss) mixed-model design. Due to a computer 
malfunction, data from one participant were incomplete. 
Materials. The objects used in the present research were postcard-sized (6 cm × 4 cm) 
prints of pictures. The pictures were selected from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) based on normative valence ratings provided by a 
sample that highly resembles the samples in the present research (i.e., university students taking 
an introductory psychology course). Based on the normative IAPS ratings, which ranged from 1 
(very unpleasant) to 9 (very pleasant), we selected two pictures with mean ratings > 5.0 and two 
pictures with mean ratings < 5.0 as positive and negative objects, respectively. When selecting 
these pictures, we took efforts to ensure that the pictures are similar in terms of their content (i.e., 
animal) and, at the same time, easily distinguishable. Two pictures of wild animals from the 
species of cats, a picture of a lion (IAPS No. 1720, M = 6.79) and a picture of two tigers (IAPS 
No. 1721, M = 7.30), were selected as positive objects. The two pictures selected as the negative 
                                                 
1 The sample size for each study was based on the availability of participants in the department's subject pool. In all 
of the five studies, we aimed to recruit as many participants as our resource allowed, with a minimum sample size of 
at least 30 participants per cell. The data for each study were collected in one shot without prior statistical analyses. 
We report all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures. All materials and data are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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objects showed a snake, which we labeled Snake A (IAPS No. 1050, M = 3.46) and Snake B 
(IAPS No. 1033, M = 3.87) for the readers’ convenience. Digital image files of the pictures are 
available in the Supplementary Online Materials.   
Ownership manipulation. Participants were told that they would receive a color print of 
a picture from a “Nature and Wild Life” collection as a special token of appreciation for their 
participation. They were told that, in a first step, two pictures would be randomly selected from 
the collection, and in a second step, a computer program would randomly select one of the two 
pictures. Participants were then presented with either the two positive pictures or the two 
negative pictures, which were displayed side by side on the computer screen. Participants were 
asked to press the space bar to start an animated random selection procedure, which involved a 
yellow frame appearing around one of the two pictures and skipping from one picture to the 
other several times before slowing down and settling on a picture. The outcome of the selection 
was displayed for six seconds, after which the two pictures were replaced by the instruction to 
find the experimenter in an adjacent room. When contacted by a participant, the experimenter 
returned to the testing room, made a note on which picture was selected, and told the participant 
that a print of the selected picture was reserved for them for pick-up after completion of the 
study.  
Measures. Implicit self-object linking was measured with a sequential priming task 
similar to that used in Gawronski et al. (2007); implicit evaluations were measured with an 
evaluative priming task (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). The order of the two 
measures was counter-balanced across participants. Each priming trial consisted of a blank 
screen (500ms), a fixation cross (200ms), a picture prime (200ms), and a target word that 
remained on the screen until participants made a categorization response by pressing either a left-
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hand key (A) or a right-hand key (Numpad 5). Both tasks included three pictures as prime stimuli: 
the two pictures of the ownership manipulation and a neutral grey rectangle. In the measure of 
implicit self-object linking, the targets included five self-related words (i.e., self, me, I, mine, and 
my) and five other-related words (i.e., other, them, their, they, and it), which had to be 
categorized as being related to the self or other. Each of the three primes was presented four 
times with each of the ten target words, summing up to a total of 120 trials. In the measure of 
implicit evaluation, the targets included 20 positive words (i.e., paradise, summer, harmony, 
freedom, honesty, honor, smile, cheer, pleasure, heaven, friend, sunrise, love, relaxation, peace, 
holiday, rainbow, luck, miracle, diamond) and 20 negative words (i.e., evil, sickness, vomit, 
bomb, murder, abuse, prison, crash, assault, cancer, pain, accident, grief, tragedy, poverty, 
pollution, virus, disaster, hatred, terror), which had to be categorized as either positive or 
negative. Each of the three primes was presented once with each of the 40 target words, 
summing up to a total of 120 trials. 
Procedure. Participants completed the study in small groups of up to five. They were 
seated in one of five cubicles in a large room and randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions defined by Object Valence and Order of Measures. Participants first 
went through the mere-ownership manipulation, followed by the two priming tasks in counter-
balanced orders. Within each of the two Object Valence conditions, half of the participants 
received one of the two alternative pictures, while the other half received the other picture. At the 
end of the study, all participants received a color-print of the picture selected for them and were 
fully debriefed.  
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Results 
Implicit self-object linking. Following the procedure of Gawronski et al. (2007), 
latencies from incorrect responses (5.1%) were eliminated and outlier latencies higher than 
1500ms (2.9% of the correct responses) were truncated. For each participant, the processed 
response latencies were averaged and coded according to the primes (i.e., owned object, non-
owned object, gray rectangle) and targets (i.e., self-related, other-related). Using the trials with 
the gray rectangle as a baseline, we calculated baseline-corrected priming scores by subtracting 
the mean latency on trials with a given object prime from the mean latency on trials with the 
baseline prime. This procedure resulted in four baseline-corrected priming scores: (1) owned-
object/self-related, (2) owned-object/other-related, (3) non-owned object/self-related, and (4) 
non-owned object/other-related. Higher values on these scores indicate facilitated responses to 
the respective targets as a function of the primes.2  
The four baseline-corrected priming scores were submitted to a 2 (Prime: owned object 
vs. non-owned object, within-Ss) × 2 (Target: self vs. other, within-Ss) × 2 (Object Valence: 
positive vs. negative, between-Ss) × 2 (Order of Measures: implicit self-object linking first vs. 
implicit evaluation first, between-Ss) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), which 
revealed a marginally significant three-way interaction of Prime, Target, and Object Valence, 
F(1, 151) = 3.48, p = .064, ηp2 = .023. All other effects were non-significant and irrelevant to our 
hypotheses, all F ≤ 2.64, p ≥ .11, ηp2 ≤ .017. 
To specify this three-way interaction, the four priming scores were further reduced to two 
indices of implicit self-object linking, one for the owned object and one for the non-owned object. 
                                                 
2 Analyses using natural-log-transformed response latencies produced similar results for implicit self-object linking 
and implicit evaluations. For the sake of consistency between reported means and the actual analyses, we report the 
results of the analyses using untransformed latencies. Preliminary analyses revealed that the results were not 
affected by the specific object participants received. 
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Scores of implicit self-object linking were calculated by subtracting the priming scores for other-
related target words from the priming scores for self-related target words given a particular prime. 
Thus, higher scores indicate higher levels of implicit self-object linking. The two indices were 
submitted to a 2 (Object Status: owned vs. non-owned, within-Ss) × 2 (Objects Valence: positive 
vs. negative, between-Ss) × 2 (Order of Measures: implicit self-object linking first vs. implicit 
evaluation first, between-Ss) mixed-model ANOVA, which revealed a marginally significant 
two-way interaction between Object Status and Object Valence (see Figure 4, left panel), 
equivalent to the three-way interaction reported above. Tests of simple effects of Object Status at 
each level of Objects Valence revealed an effect of ownership on implicit self-object linking for 
positive objects, but not for negative objects. Specifically, for positive objects, scores of implicit 
self-object linking were significantly larger for the owned object (M = 13.18) than for the non-
owned object (M = -9.89), F(1,151) = 6.06, p = .015, ηp2 = .039. For negative objects, scores of 
implicit self-object linking were not significantly different for the owned object (M = 2.57) and 
the non-owned object (M = 4.16), F(1,151) = 0.029, p = .86, ηp2 < .001.  
Implicit evaluation. The evaluative priming data were processed following the same 
procedure for the implicit self-object linking measure. Response latencies from incorrect 
responses (3.2%) were eliminated and outlier latencies higher than 1500ms (2.6% of the correct 
responses) were truncated. Using the trials with the gray rectangle as a baseline, four baseline-
corrected priming scores were obtained: (1) owned-object/positive, (2) owned-object/negative, (3) 
non-owned object/positive, and (4) non-owned object/negative. Higher values on these scores 
indicate facilitated responses to the respective targets as a function of the primes. The four 
priming scores were submitted to a 2 (Prime: owned object vs. non-owned object, within-Ss) × 2 
(Target: positive words vs. negative words, within-Ss) × 2 (Objects Valence: positive vs. 
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negative, between-Ss) × 2 (Order of Measures: implicit self-object linking first vs. implicit 
evaluation first, between-Ss) mixed-model ANOVA, which revealed a significant three-way 
interaction between Prime, Target, and Object Valence, F(1, 151) = 5.49, p = .020, ηp2 = .035. 
All other effects were non-significant and irrelevant to our hypotheses, all F ≤ 2.61, p ≥ .11, ηp2 
≤ .017.  
To specify this three-way interaction, the four priming scores were reduced to two indices 
of implicit evaluation: one for the owned object and one for the non-owned object.  Scores of 
implicit evaluation were calculated by subtracting the priming scores for negative target words 
from the priming scores for positive target words given a particular prime. Thus, higher scores 
indicate more favorable implicit evaluations. The two indices were submitted to a 2 (Object 
Status: owned vs. non-owned, within-Ss) × 2 (Object Valence: positive vs. negative, between-Ss) 
× 2 (Order of Measurement: affective priming first vs. sequential priming first, between-Ss) 
mixed-model ANOVA, which revealed a significant two-way interaction between Object Status 
and Object Valence (see Figure 4, right panel), equivalent to the three-way interaction reported 
above. Tests of simple effects of Object Status at different levels of Objects Valence revealed an 
effect of ownership on implicit evaluations for positive objects, but not for negative objects. For 
positive objects, implicit evaluations were significantly more favorable for the owned object (M 
= 8.41) than the non-owned object (M = -10.22), F(1,151) = 4.09, p = .045, ηp2 = .026. For 
negative objects, implicit evaluations did not significantly differ for the owned object (M = -8.00) 
and non-owned object (M = 3.80), F(1,151) = 1.66, p = .20, ηp2 = .011.  
Discussion 
As predicted, ownership influenced implicit self-object linking for positive objects, but 
not for negative objects. The obtained effects for positive objects are consistent with the notion 
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that pre-existing self-object congruity, induced by positive valence shared by the owner’s self 
and the owned object, facilitates the formation of a mental association between the owner’s self 
and the owned object. Moreover, the absence of ownership effects for negative objects is 
consistent with the notion that pre-existing self-object incongruity, induced by positive valence 
associated with the self and negative valence associated with the owned object, inhibits the 
formation of a mental association between the owner’s self and the owned object.  
A similar pattern emerged for implicit evaluations, which showed more favorable 
responses to owned compared to non-owned objects when the objects were positive, but not 
when they were negative. Together with the obtained effects on implicit self-object linking, these 
findings are consistent with the proposed transfer of valence from the self to the owned object 
through the newly created association between the owner’s self and the owned object 
(Gawronski et al., 2007; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  
In addition to offering deeper insights into the mental underpinnings of mere ownership 
effects, the present findings provide supporting evidence for the two principles proposed by 
balanced-identity theory, especially the previously untested principle of imbalance-dissonance 
(Cvencek et al., 2012; Greenwald et al., 2002). The findings also suggest an important boundary 
condition of the mere-ownership effect (Beggan, 1992): the effect may hold only when the 
relevant objects are of positive valence but not when they are of negative valence.3 Thus, an 
interesting follow-up question is whether there are conditions under which ownership can 
                                                 
3 A potential concern is that the two objects in the positive condition were more dissimilar to each other (i.e., picture 
of a tiger vs. picture of a lion) than the two objects in the negative condition (i.e., two pictures of a snake). Hence, 
the obtained effects might be due to differences in the ease of distinguishing between the two alternative objects 
rather than their different valence. In response to this concern, it is worth noting that the results in the positive 
condition replicated earlier findings by Gawronski et al. (2007), who used two positive images of highly similar 
content (i.e., two pictures of a desert landscape) in a mere-ownership situation. Moreover, Studies 2-5 of the current 
research showed meaningful ownership-by-choice effects for the two negative objects, effectively ruling out 
alternative interpretations in terms of differential similarity.   
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influence implicit self-object linking for negative objects. This question was addressed in Study 
2.  
Study 2 
According to our theoretical framework, it is important to distinguish between two 
different types of ownership situations: mere-ownership and ownership-by-choice. In mere-
ownership situations, self-object association formation is mainly driven by pressure from the 
situation. In ownership-by-choice situations, decision-related processing should enhance self-
object congruity for the chosen object and self-object incongruity for the rejected object, and 
thereby facilitate the formation of self-object associations for owned objects. Hence, ownership 
effects should be constrained by pre-existing self-object incongruity (e.g., negative valence) in 
mere-ownership, but not ownership-by-choice, situations.  
The main goal of Study 2 was to test this hypothesis. Toward this end, we compared the 
effects of ownership of a negative object on implicit self-object linking in mere-ownership and 
ownership-by-choice situations. We predicted that, for negative objects, ownership should 
influence implicit self-object linking in ownership-by-choice situations but not in mere-
ownership situations. To test this prediction, participants either received a negative object that 
was selected randomly from a set of two negative objects (mere-ownership) or were free to 
choose a negative object from the same set of negative objects (ownership-by-choice). 
Afterwards, all participants completed a measure of implicit self-object linking.4  
                                                 
4 To reduce the complexity of the design, the measure of implicit evaluation was dropped from Study 2 for practical 
reasons. 
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Method  
Participants and design. A total of 100 participants (65 women, 35 men) were recruited 
through posters on campus and the summer subject pool mailing list of the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Western Ontario. Participants received CAD-$10 as a 
compensation for the completion of a one-hour battery that included two unrelated studies and 
this study as the third component. The study used a 2 (Ownership Situation: mere-ownership vs. 
ownership-by-choice, between-Ss) × 2 (Object Status: owned vs. non-owned, within-Ss) mixed-
model design. Data from one participant were lost due to a computer malfunction. 
Ownership manipulations. As in Study 1, participants were told that they were going to 
receive a color print of a picture from the “Nature and Wild Life” collection as a special token of 
appreciation. Participants in both experimental conditions were informed that, as the first step, 
two alternative pictures would be randomly selected from the collection. In the mere-ownership 
condition, participants were told that the picture they were about to receive would be selected 
randomly from the two alternative pictures by a computer program. In the ownership-by-choice 
condition, participants were told that they could choose the picture that they personally prefer.  
In both conditions, participants were then presented with the two snake pictures from 
Study 1. In the mere-ownership condition, participants were told to press the space bar to start 
the random selection animation as in Study 1. In the ownership-by-choice condition, participants 
were told to take a careful look at the two pictures and think about which one they prefer. After 
20 seconds, they were told to press either Numpad 1 or Numpad 2 on the keyboard to choose the 
picture on the left or right, respectively. The left-right positions of the two pictures on the screen 
were counter-balanced across participants. After participants in the ownership-by-choice 
condition had made their decision, a yellow frame appeared around the chosen picture. In both 
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conditions, participants were asked to find the experimenter after the selected picture was 
determined. When contacted by the participant, the experimenter returned to the testing room, 
made a note on which picture was selected, and told the participant that a print of the selected 
picture was reserved for them for pick-up after completion of the study. 
Measures. In Study 2, we adopted the implicit association test (IAT, Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) as a measure of implicit self-object linking. This decision was 
based on the need for a measure that has been shown to be more reliable than the priming tasks 
in Study 1 (see Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014). Although the IAT does not permit a calculation 
of separate scores for owned and non-owned objects, its relative nature fits well with a 
conceptualization of ownership effects as the difference between implicit self-object linking for 
the owned object as compared to the non-owned object (cf. Greenwald et al., 1998).  
In this study, the IAT was introduced as a “quick categorization task.” Participants were 
asked to categorize pictures and words by pressing either a left-hand key (A) or a right-hand key 
(Numpad 5). In line with the standard protocol, the IAT consisted of five blocks. Following 
procedures by Steffens, Kirschbaum, and Glados (2008), we used the two snake pictures as the 
target categories as well as the target stimuli, which has been shown to reduce the impact of 
stimulus confounds and increase the validity of the measure. The first block consisted of 20 trials, 
in which participants were asked to categorize the pictures of Snake A and Snake B (initial 
target-concept discrimination task). The particular key assignment for the two images was 
indicated by small icons of Snake A and Snake B at the top-left and the top-right corners, 
respectively. The same two pictures in formats of approximately 400 pixel × 300 pixel were used 
as targets, each being displayed in the center of the screen on 10 of the 20 trials. The second 
block consisted of 20 trials, in which participants were asked to categorize ten words as related 
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to “self” or “other” (attribute discrimination task). Five words related to self (i.e., self, me, I, 
mine, my) and five words related to other (i.e., other, them, their, they, it) were displayed in the 
center of the screen, each on two trials. Participants were asked to press a left-hand key (A) for 
self-related words and a right-hand key (Numpad 5) for other-related words. The third block 
consisted of 60 trials in two sub-blocks, one of 20 trials and one of 40 trials, with Self or Snake A 
as the left-hand category and Other or Snake B as the right-hand category (initial combined task). 
The targets were the two snake pictures (each on 15 trials) and the ten target words (each on 
three trials) from the previous two blocks, presented in random order. The fourth block consisted 
of 20 trials, in which participants were asked to categorize the pictures of Snake A and Snake B 
with a reversed key assignment (reversed target-concept discrimination task). The fifth block 
consisted of 60 trials in two sub-blocks, one of 20 trials and one of 40 trials, with Self or Snake B 
as the left-hand category and Other or Snake A as the right-hand category (reversed combined 
task). The order of the five blocks was held constant for all participants to reduce systematic 
error variance, which can reduce statistical power to detect existing effects (see Gawronski, 
Deutsch, & Banse, 2011). Participants were told to respond as quickly as possible without 
making too many errors. Whenever an incorrect response was made, the word Error was 
displayed in center of the screen for 1000ms before the next trial.  
Procedure. The study was run in small groups of up to five. Participants were seated in 
one of five cubicles in a large room and randomly assigned to one of the two conditions of 
Ownership Situation. Participants first completed the ownership task, followed by the IAT. In the 
mere-ownership condition, half of the participants received the picture of Snake A, and the other 
half received the picture of Snake B. In the ownership-by-choice condition, the picture 
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participants received was determined by their own choice. At the end of study, all participants 
received a color-print of the selected picture and were fully debriefed.  
Results 
Consistent with the presumed equivalence of the two objects, 24 of the 50 participants in 
the ownership-by-choice condition chose the picture of Snake A; 26 participants chose the 
picture of Snake B. The response latency data from the IAT were aggregated with the D-600 
algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), which is the recommended scoring procedure for 
IAT’s in which participants proceed to the next stimulus following an incorrect response without 
having to provide the correct response (Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007). No 
participant showed latencies faster than 300ms on 10% or more of the trials in the two combined 
blocks (cf. Greenwald et al., 2003). Using each participants’ selection outcome as a reference, 
IAT scores were calculated such that higher scores indicate stronger implicit self-object linking 
for the owned object compared to the non-owned object. To estimate the reliability of the 
measure, we calculated two IAT scores for each participant using the two sub-blocks of the 
combined blocks (i.e., the third and the fifth block). Our analysis revealed a Cronbach’s α of .69 
for combining the two IAT scores in a single score.    
Because the display position of two pictures during the ownership and choice procedure 
did not influence the results, this variable was not included in the following analyses. Submitted 
to a 2 (Ownership Situation, mere-ownership vs. ownership-by-choice, between-Ss) × 2 (IAT 
Block Order: the owned object mapped with “self” in the first combined block vs. the owned 
object mapped with “self” in the second combined block, between-Ss) mixed-model ANOVA, 
the IAT scores revealed a significant main effect of IAT Block Order, F(1, 95) = 53.82, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .36, replicating the well-documented order effect of shorter response latencies in the first 
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combined block than in the second combined block (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005).5 More 
importantly, the analysis also revealed a significant main effect of Ownership Situation, F(1, 95) 
= 5.86, p = .017, ηp2 = .058, indicating a stronger effect of ownership on implicit self-object 
linking in the ownership-by-choice condition than in the mere-ownership condition (see Figure 
5). The 2-way interaction between IAT Block Order and Ownership Situation was non-
significant, F(1, 95) = 0.30, p = .58, ηp2 = .003. Further analyses revealed that IAT scores of 
ownership effects were significantly larger than zero in the ownership-by-choice condition, M = 
0.29, t(49) = 4.42, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.16, 0.42], but not in the mere-ownership condition, M = 
0.064, t(48) = 0.97, p = .34, 95% C.I. [-0.07, 0.20].  
Discussion 
As predicted, Study 2 found that the ownership of a negative object influenced implicit 
self-object linking in ownership-by-choice, but not in mere-ownership, situations. This finding is 
consistent with our theoretical framework. In ownership-by-choice situations, decision-related 
processing of object information is assumed to increase self-object congruity for the chosen 
object and self-object incongruity for the rejected object. This process should attenuate the 
moderating effect of pre-existing object properties (e.g., negative valence) on the effects of 
ownership on implicit self-object linking, as obtained in the current study.  
Although the findings are consistent with our prediction, an alternative interpretation is 
that the effects are due to pre-existing differences between the chosen object and rejected object, 
rather than induced changes, in self-object congruity (see Chen & Risen, 2010, for a thorough 
                                                 
5 For those who owned the picture of Snake A during the choice task, the owned object is mapped with “self” as one 
set of combined categories in the first combined block and with other in the second combined block (vice versa for 
those who owned the picture of Snake B). By keeping the block order in the IAT constant, the obtained block order 
effect is counterbalanced in the unweighted group means of the IAT index, because some participants owned the 
picture of Snake A while others owned the picture of Snake B.  
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analysis of this issue). Specifically, it is possible that participants simply chose the picture that 
had a higher level of pre-existing self-object congruity instead of increasing the level of self-
object congruity through decision-related processing. For positive objects, this alternative 
interpretation has been ruled out by Gawronski et al. (2007, Experiment 2), who found a 
significant difference in implicit self-object linking for chosen and rejected objects only after, but 
not before, participants made their choice. Yet, it is still unclear if these effects generalize to 
negative objects. Study 3 aimed to address this concern. 
Study 3 
The main goal of Study 3 was to test whether the ownership effect observed in Study 2’s 
ownership-by-choice condition indeed reflects a causal effect of choice or a methodological 
artifact caused by pre-existing differences between the chosen and rejected objects in self-object 
congruity (Chen & Risen, 2010). Toward this end, we adopted a pre-post design (Gawronski et 
al., 2007), in which implicit self-object linking was measured either before or after the choice 
task. If the findings of Study 2 were caused by the choice, implicit self-object linking should 
show an ownership effect only when it is measured after the choice task (post-choice) but not 
when it is measured before the task (pre-choice). If, however, the findings of Study 2 reflect pre-
existing differences is self-object congruity, implicit self-object linking should show an 
ownership effect both before and after the choice task.  
Method  
Participants and design. A total of 90 participants (50 women, 38 men, 2 unspecified) 
from the subject pool of the Department of Psychology at the University of Western Ontario 
participated for research credit. Data from three participants were lost due to a computer 
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malfunction. The study used a 2 (Time of Measurement, pre-choice vs. post-choice, between-Ss) 
× 2 (Object Status: owned vs. non-owned, within-Ss) mixed-model design.6  
Procedure. In the pre-choice condition, participants first completed the measure of 
implicit self-object linking and then the same choice task as in Study 2. In the post-choice 
condition, participants first completed the choice task and then the measure of implicit self-
object linking. The two negative snake pictures from previous studies were included as choice 
alternatives, with their positions in the choice task being counterbalanced across participants. All 
measures, materials, and procedures were identical to Study 2. 
Results 
In the pre-choice condition, 20 participants chose the picture of Snake A and 24 chose the 
picture of Snake B. In the post-choice condition, 21 participants chose the picture of Snake A 
and 21 chose the picture of Snake B. As in Study 2, the IAT data were aggregated with the D-
600 algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003). No participant showed latencies faster than 300ms on 10% 
or more of the trials in the two combined blocks (cf. Greenwald et al., 2003). IAT scores 
(Cronbach’s α = 71, estimated using the same procedure as in Study 2) were coded according to 
each participant’s choice outcome, such that higher scores indicate stronger implicit self-object 
linking for the owned compared to the non-owned object. 
As the display position of the two pictures during the choice task did not influence the 
results, this variable was not included in the following analyses. Submitted to a 2 (Time of 
Measurement, pre-choice vs. post-choice, between Ss) × 2 (IAT Block Order: the chosen object 
mapped with “self” in the first combined block vs. the chosen object mapped with “self” in the 
                                                 
6 Time of Measurement was manipulated between-subjects instead of within-subjects due to the concern that 
repeated administrations of the IAT within the same session might attenuate the magnitude of the effect (see Nosek, 
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007).  
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second combined block, between Ss) ANOVA, IAT scores revealed a significant effect of IAT 
Block Order similar to the one obtained in Study 2, F(1, 83) = 59.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .42. More 
importantly, a significant main effect of Time of Measurement indicated that IAT scores of 
ownership effects were larger in the post-choice condition than in the pre-choice condition, F(1, 
83) = 4.58, p = .035, ηp2 = .052 (see Figure 6). The two-way interaction between Time of 
Measurement and IAT Block Order was non-significant, F(1, 83) = 0.48, p = .49, ηp2 = .006. 
Follow-up analyses revealed that the mean ownership effect was significantly different from zero 
in the post-choice condition, M = 0.17, t(42) = 3.09, p = .004, 95% C.I. [0.06, 0.28], but not in 
the pre-choice condition, M = 0.006, t(43) = 1.11, p = .27, 95% C.I. [-0.10, 0.11].  
Discussion 
Ruling out pre-existing differences in self-object congruity as an alternative explanation 
for the findings of Study 2, Study 3 found a significant ownership effect on implicit self-object 
linking only after, but not before, participants went through the choice task. The findings support 
the hypothesis that choice effects on implicit self-object linking in ownership-by-choice 
situations are caused by choice-related processes (e.g., decision-related information processing) 
rather than pre-existing differences in self-object congruity between the chosen and rejected 
objects. In Study 4, we further investigated this hypothesis by exploring the impact of contextual 
factors that presumably influence the degree of decision-related processing.   
Study 4 
The findings of Studies 2 and 3 provide evidence for a causal effect of choice on the 
formation of self-object associations with objects of negative valence. In the following two 
studies, we aimed to further investigate the psychological processes underlying this effect. As we 
proposed in our theoretical framework, the obtained choice effects may be driven by enhanced 
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self-object congruity with chosen objects and self-object incongruity with rejected objects as a 
result of pre- and post-decision processing. Following this reasoning, enhanced levels of pre- and 
post-decision processing should result in higher levels of self-object congruity for the chosen 
object and self-object incongruity for the rejected object, resulting in stronger self-object 
associations for the chosen object than for the rejected object.  
The main goal of Study 4 was to examine the effects of two contextual factors that may 
influence the degree of decision-related information processing: expectation of ownership before 
the decision (ownership expectation) and physical ownership of the chosen object after the 
decision (physical ownership). We argue that the two factors may influence the degree of 
decision-related information processing by increasing the self-relevance of the decision, that is, 
the extent to which the outcomes are personally relevant to the individual (Gendolla, 1999; 
Schmitz & Johnson, 2007). To the extent that pre-decision expectation of ownership and post-
decision physical ownership increases the levels of self-relevance before or after the decision, 
and to the extent that increased levels of self-relevance lead to higher levels of pre- and post-
decision information processing, both factors should enhance ownership effects on implicit self-
object linking. To allow for comparison of the present findings with those from classic 
dissonance research on the effects of free choice on explicit evaluations (e.g., Brehm, 1956; 
Harmon-Jones et al., 2008; Jecker, 1964), the current study also included a measure of explicit 
evaluations.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 154 participants (105 women, 43 men, 6 unspecified) 
from the subject pool of the University of Western Ontario participated for research credit. The 
study adopted a 2 (Ownership Expectation: with vs. without, between-Ss) × 2 (Physical 
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Ownership: with vs. without, between-Ss) × 2 (Object Status: owned vs. non-owned, within-Ss) 
mixed-model design. Due to program malfunctions, five participants did not complete the 
measure of implicit self-object linking, resulting in an effective sample size of 149. 
Ownership expectation. At the beginning of the choice task, participants in the with-
ownership-expectation condition were told that they would receive a gift as a special token of 
appreciation; participants in the without-ownership-expectation condition were told to evaluate 
two pictures and indicate which one they personally prefer. As in Studies 2 and 3, all participants 
then went through the same choice task with the two negative snake pictures as the choice 
alternatives. When the two pictures were displayed on the screen, those in the with-ownership-
expectation condition were asked which one they prefer and would like to receive as a gift, while 
those in the without-ownership-expectation condition were simply asked to think about the 
pictures and indicate which one they prefer. After participants indicated their preferences, those 
in the without-ownership-expectation condition were then informed that they would actually 
receive a print of the picture they had chosen as a special token of appreciation. Participants in 
both conditions were then instructed to find the experimenter in an adjacent room.  
Physical ownership. When contacted by the participants, the experimenter returned to 
the testing room, bringing a color-print of each picture. In the with-physical-ownership condition, 
the experimenter asked the participant which one they had chosen and then gave a color-print of 
the chosen picture to the participant. Participants were asked to put the picture either into their 
bags or on the computer desk with the picture side facing downwards. In the without-physical-
ownership condition, the experimenter told the participant that a print of the picture they had 
chosen would be reserved so that they could get it at the end of the study.  
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Measures. To measure implicit self-object linking, we used the same IAT that was used 
in Studies 2 and 3. Explicit evaluations were measured with six-point semantic differentials, 
using the attribute pairs attractive-unattractive, pleasant-unpleasant, and terrible-great.  
Procedure. The study was run as the first component of a three-part battery that included 
this study and two unrelated components. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
between-subjects conditions defined by Ownership Expectation and Physical Ownership. 
Participants first completed the choice task and then the IAT, followed by the explicit evaluation 
measure. At the end of the study, all participants were fully debriefed. Participants in all 
conditions received a print of the chosen picture.  
Results 
Choices. Overall, the numbers of participants who chose the picture of Snake A (Snake B) 
are, respectively, 69 (80) in the entire sample, which broke down to 18 (19) in the condition with 
ownership expectation and physical ownership, 22 (19) in the condition with ownership 
expectation and without physical ownership, 12 (24) in the condition without ownership 
expectation and with physical ownership, and 17 (18) in the condition without ownership 
expectation and without physical ownership.7  
Implicit self-object linking. No participant showed latencies faster than 300ms on 10% 
or more of the trials in the two combined blocks (cf. Greenwald et al., 2003). IAT scores of 
ownership effects on implicit self-object linking were calculated in the same way as in previous 
studies (Cronbach’s α = .63, estimated using the same procedure as in Study 2). Preliminary 
analyses indicated that the position of the two pictures did not influence any of the results and 
                                                 
7 The ANOVA in the present study was performed with Model 1 sum of squares, which is based on unweighted cell 
means. This procedure eliminates effects of unequal numbers of observations per cell on the results. 
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was therefore not included in the analyses below. Submitted to a 2 (Ownership Expectation, with 
vs. without, between Ss) × 2 (Physical Ownership, with vs. without, between Ss) × 2 (IAT Block 
Order: the chosen object mapped with “self” in the first combined block vs. the chosen object 
paired mapped with “self” in the second combined block, between Ss) ANOVA, IAT scores 
yielded a significant effect of IAT Block Order effect similar to the one obtained in previous 
studies, F(1, 141) = 84.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .37. Counter to our predictions, there was no 
significant main effect of Ownership Expectation, F(1, 141) = 1.00, p = .32, ηp2 = .007, no 
significant main effect of Physical Ownership, F(1, 141) = 0.004, p = .95, ηp2 < .001, and no 
significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 141) = 0.88, p = .35, ηp2 = .006. The means 
and standard deviations for this analysis are shown in Table 1.  
Follow-up analyses revealed that IAT scores of ownership effects were significantly 
different from zero in the full sample (M = 0.20, SD = 0.38), t(148) = 6.36, p < .001, 95% C.I. 
[0.14, 0.26], and in each of the four experimental conditions: in the condition with ownership 
expectation and with physical ownership, M = 0.26, t(36) = 4.12, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.13, 0.38]; 
in the condition with ownership expectation and without physical ownership, M = 0.20, t(40) = 
3.40, p = .002, 95% C.I. [0.08, 0.32]; in the condition without ownership expectation and with 
physical ownership, M = 0.13, t(35) = 1.99, p = .04, 95% C.I. [.005, 0.26]; and in the condition 
without ownership expectation and without physical ownership, M = 0.20, t(34) = 3.08, p = .004, 
95% C.I. [0.07, 0.33]. All four group means were in the expected direction, indicating stronger 
levels of implicit self-object linking for the chosen object compared with the rejected object.  
Explicit evaluations. Of the 149 participants included in the analyses for implicit self-
object linking, five participants had missing data in the measure of explicit evaluations due to 
program malfunctions. The Cronbach’s αs were .82 for the three items about Snake A and .86 for 
OWNERSHIP AND IMPLICIT SELF-OBJECT LINKING  33 
the three items about Snake B. Two explicit evaluation indices, one for the chosen object and one 
for the rejected object, were calculated by averaging the three items for each picture and 
recoding the resulting scores according to each participant’s choice outcome. Preliminary 
analyses indicated that the position of the two pictures did not influence any of the results and 
was therefore not included in the analyses reported. Submitted to a 2 (Ownership Expectation, 
with vs. without, between Ss) × 2 (Physical Ownership, with vs. without, between Ss) × 2 
(Object Status, chosen vs. rejected, within Ss) mixed-model ANOVA, explicit evaluation scores 
yielded a significant main effect of Object Status, F(1, 136) = 116.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .46, and a 
significant two-way interaction between Object Status and Physical Ownership, F(1, 136) = 9.70, 
p = .002, ηp2 = .067. All other effects were non-significant, all F ≤ 1.76, p ≥ .19, ηp2 ≤ .013.   
The means for the two-way interaction between Object Status and Physical Ownership 
are depicted in Figure 7. Tests of simple effects indicated that, in the with-physical-ownership 
condition, explicit evaluations of the chosen object (M = 3.67) were significantly more favorable 
than explicit evaluations of the rejected object (M = 2.53), F(1, 136) = 93.57, p < .001, d = 0.90. 
In the without-physical-ownership condition, explicit evaluations of the chosen object (M = 3.51) 
were also significantly more favorable than explicit evaluations of the rejected object (M = 2.88), 
F(1, 136) = 30.25, p < .001, d = 0.51, but the effect size of this difference was substantially 
smaller compared to the with-physical-ownership condition. Thus, ownership effects on explicit 
evaluations were larger in the with-physical-ownership condition than in the without-physical-
ownership condition.  
Discussion 
Counter to the predictions that pre-decision ownership expectation and post-decision 
physical ownership should lead to larger ownership effects on implicit self-object linking, Study 
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4 revealed similar levels of ownership effects on implicit self-object linking regardless of 
whether participants did or did not expect ownership prior to their choice, and regardless of 
whether participants did or did not physically own the chose object at the time of measurement.  
Interestingly, explicit evaluations showed a stronger ownership effect when participants 
had physical ownership than when they did not. The differential effect of physical ownership on 
explicit evaluations and implicit self-object linking suggests that explicit evaluations are 
influenced by factors that go beyond the associative transfer of valence from the self to owned 
objects. Consistent with the notion of post-decisional dissonance (Brehm, 1956; Festinger, 1957, 
1964), it is possible that physical ownership enhanced participants’ motivation to justify their 
choice. Such motivated rationalization may influence explicit evaluations without affecting the 
strength of self-object associations. Although this pattern conflicts with our predictions, it is 
consistent with earlier findings by Gawronski and Strack (2004) showing that cognitive 
dissonance influences explicit, but not implicit, evaluations (see also Wilson, Lindsey, & 
Schooler, 2000). Nevertheless, the current study revealed consistent ownership effects on 
implicit self-object linking, suggesting that pre-decision processing played a central role for the 
obtained effects. Together, these findings indicate that pre-decision processing might have a 
stronger impact on the formation of self-object associations than post-decision processing.  
 Also contrary to our predictions, ownership expectation had no effect on implicit self-
object linking as well as explicit evaluations. A potential factor that might have contributed to 
this null effect is that participants in the without-ownership-expectation condition were informed 
about the upcoming ownership after they expressed their preference. Hence, the new expectation 
of ownership after the decision might have overridden any effect of ownership expectations prior 
to the decision. Thus, to provide a more stringent test of the effect of ownership expectations, it 
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might be important to control for the knowledge of ownership throughout the entire study. This 
was done in Study 5.  
Study 5 
Study 5 had two goals. First, we aimed to conduct a more stringent test of the effects of 
ownership expectation compared to the one in Study 4. Towards this end, we changed the 
experimental procedure, such that participants in the without-ownership-expectation condition 
were asked to simply make a choice between two objects, without any knowledge about 
ownership throughout the procedure. As the term ownership effect no longer applies to this 
condition, we use the term choice effect in the current study. In line with the hypothesis in Study 
4, we predicted larger choice effects on implicit self-object linking for participants with 
ownership expectation compared to those without ownership expectation. Second, we aimed to 
further clarify the roles of pre- and post-decision processing on the formation of self-object 
associations. The findings of Study 4 suggest that, for negative objects, pre-decision processing 
may play a more important role than post-decision processing in self-object association 
formation. In order to dissociate the effects of pre- vs. post-decision processing, we measured 
implicit self-object linking (1) after participants had completed the elaboration but before they 
overtly expressed their decision (before decision), and (2) after participants had expressed their 
decision (after decision). Whereas choice effects on implicit self-object linking before decision 
reflect the impact of pre-decision processing, additional choice effects after decision reflect the 
impact of post-decision processing.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 139 participants (94 women, 45 men) from the 
subject pool of the University of Western Ontario participated for research credit. The study 
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adopted a 2 (Ownership Expectation: with vs. without, between-Ss) × 2 (Time of Measurement: 
before decision vs. after decision, between-Ss) × 2 (Object Status: chosen vs. non-chosen, 
within-Ss) mixed-model design.  
Ownership expectation. Ownership expectations were manipulated in line with the 
procedure of Study 4, with a key difference: participants in the without-ownership-expectation 
condition were simply asked to evaluate the two objects and indicate which one they personally 
prefer.  
Measures. The study included the same IAT and the same measure of explicit evaluation 
as those in Study 4. All participants completed the IAT first and then the measure of explicit 
evaluation.  
Time of measurement. After participants spent 20 seconds evaluating the two pictures, 
they were asked if they were ready to indicate their choice. When participants reported that they 
are ready, those in the before-decision condition were asked to complete the two measures before 
indicating their choice. Participants in the after-decision condition were asked to indicate their 
choice and then completed the two measures.  
Procedure. After signing informed consent forms, participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the four conditions and then went through the choice task and the two measures. 
Different from the previous studies, participants in the with-ownership-expectation condition 
were not asked to contact the experimenter after they indicated their choice. Instead, they were 
told to memorize their decision, so that they could receive a copy of the chosen object after they 
completed the measures. At the end of the study, all participants were fully debriefed. Only 
participants in the with-ownership-expectation condition received a print of the chosen picture.  
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Results 
Choices. Overall, the numbers of participants who chose the picture of Snake A (Snake B) 
are, respectively, 69 (66) in the entire sample, which broke down to 17 (17) in the before-
decision condition with ownership expectation, 20 (14) in the after-decision condition with 
ownership expectation, 13 (20) in the before-decision condition without ownership expectation, 
and 19 (15) in the after-decision condition without ownership expectation and without physical 
ownership. 
Implicit self-object linking. No participant showed latencies faster than 300ms on 10% 
or more of the trials in the two combined blocks (cf. Greenwald et al., 2003). IAT scores of 
choice effects on implicit self-object linking were aggregated in the same way as in the previous 
studies (Cronbach’s α = .62, estimated using the same procedure as in Study 2).8 Submitted to a 
2 (Ownership Expectation, with vs. without, between Ss) × 2 (Time of Measurement, before 
decision vs. after-decision, between Ss) × 2 (IAT Block Order: chosen object mapped with “self” 
in the first combined block vs. chosen object mapped with “self” in the second combined block, 
between Ss) ANOVA, IAT scores yielded a significant IAT Block Order effect, F(1, 127) = 
87.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .41, similar to the block order effect found in previous studies. Counter to 
our predictions, there was no significant main effect of Ownership Expectation, F(1, 127) = 0.17, 
p = .69, ηp2 = .001, no significant main effect of Time of Measurement, F(1, 127) = 0.18, p = .67, 
ηp2 = .001, and no significant interaction between these two factors, F(1, 127) = 0.12, p = .73, 
ηp2 = .001. The means and standard deviations for this analysis are shown in Table 2.  
                                                 
8 Preliminary analyses with Displayed Position (left vs. right) included as a factor revealed a significant two-way 
interaction between Display Position and Time of Measurement, F(1, 119) = 5.30. p = .023, ηp2 = .043, and a 
marginally significant two-way interaction between Display Position and Ownership Expectation, F(1, 119) = 3.91. 
p = .050, ηp2 = .032. This was the first time in four studies that such effects were found, and the effects were 
uninterpretable. The exclusion of Display Position did not change any of the reported results.  
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Follow-up analyses revealed that IAT scores of choice effects were significantly different 
from zero in the full sample (M = 0.23, SD = 0.36), t(134) = 7.52, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.17, 
0.29], and in each of the four experimental conditions: in the before-decision condition with 
ownership expectation, M = 0.22, t(33) = 3.65, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.10, 0.35]; in the after-
decision condition with ownership expectation, M = 0.22, t(33) = 3.59, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.09, 
0.34]; in the before-decision condition without ownership expectation, M = 0.27, t(32) = 4.36, p 
< .001, 95% C.I. [0.14, 0.40]; and in the after-decision condition without ownership expectation, 
M = 0.22, t(33) = 3.65, p < .001, 95% C.I. [0.10, 0.35]. All means were in the expected direction, 
indicating stronger levels of implicit self-object linking for the chosen object compared with the 
rejected object.   
Explicit evaluations. The Cronbach’s α was .83 for the of the three items about Snake A 
and .85 for those about Snake B. Explicit evaluation scores were averaged and recoded into two 
evaluation scores, one for the chosen object and one for the rejected object. Display position of 
the pictures did not influence any of the results and was therefore not included in the reported 
analyses. Submitted to a 2 (Ownership Expectation, with vs. without, between Ss) × 2 (Time of 
Measurement, before decision vs. after decision, between Ss) × 2 (Object Status, chosen vs. 
rejected, within Ss) mixed-model ANOVA, explicit evaluations yielded a significant main effect 
of Object Status, F(1, 131) = 87.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, indicating that explicit evaluations of the 
chosen object (M = 3.49, SD = 1.20) were more positive than explicit evaluations of the rejected 
object (M = 2.60, SD = 1.10). All other effects were non-significant, all F ≤ 0.54, p ≥ .46, ηp2 
≤ .004. 
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Discussion 
To address a methodological limitation of Study 4, the current study employed a cleaner 
manipulation of ownership expectation. Instead of being informed about their upcoming 
ownership, participants in the without-ownership-expectation condition did not receive any such 
information until the end of the study. Nevertheless, pre-decision ownership expectation did not 
qualify the size of choice effects on either implicit self-object linking or explicit evaluations. 
Interestingly, in the without-ownership-expectation condition where participants were asked to 
elaborate on and indicate their preference, we still found a choice effect on implicit self-object 
linking. This finding provides further support for the contribution of pre-decision processing to 
the formation of self-object associations, which may occur even in the absence of actual 
ownership.  
Counter to our predictions, Study 5 also revealed no moderating effect of time of 
measurement. Instead, we found similar levels of choice effects on implicit self-object linking 
and explicit evaluations regardless of whether the measures were taken (1) after participants 
completed the pre-decision processing but before they overtly expressed their decision or (2) 
after participants had expressed their decision. In line with the findings of Studies 3 and 4, these 
findings further support the notions that self-object associations (1) are formed during pre-
decision processing and (2) are not further strengthened by post-decision processing for negative 
objects.  
General Discussion 
The present research examined how ownership influences the relation between owners 
and their possessions. Adopting an associative approach, we conceptualized this relation as a 
mental association between the node representing the owner’s self and the node representing the 
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owned object. We argued that the strength of this association determines implicit self-object 
linking, defined as the behavior of automatically connecting the self and a given object on an 
implicit measure. Drawing on the principles of balance-congruity and imbalance-dissonance 
proposed by balanced identity theory (Cvencek et al., 2012; Greenwald et al., 2002), we tested 
several predictions about possible boundary conditions (i.e., type of ownership situations and 
object valence) for the effects of ownership on implicit self-object linking.  
Consistent with the hypothesis that the formation of self-object associations in mere-
ownership situations should be moderated by pre-existing object properties involving self-object 
congruity and incongruity, we found mere-ownership effects on implicit self-object linking only 
for positive objects, but not for negative objects. Moreover, we found that for negative objects, 
ownership influenced implicit self-object linking only when ownership resulted from the owner’s 
personal choice (ownership-by-choice), but not when ownership was determined on the basis of 
a random procedure (mere-ownership). Additional findings suggest that this effect was caused by 
the choice rather than pre-existing differences in self-object congruity (cf. Chen & Risen, 2010). 
These finding are consistent with the hypothesis that decision-related processing enhances self-
object congruity for chosen objects and self-object incongruity for rejected objects, which should 
facilitate the formation of self-object associations in ownership-by-choice situations.  
Testing the impact of potential moderators, ownership-by-choice effects on implicit self-
object linking turned out to be much more resistant to contextual factors we than expected.9 
Counter to our predictions, pre-decision expectancies of ownership and post-decision physical 
                                                 
9 To examine how strongly our data support the null hypotheses regarding the moderating effects on implicit self-
object linking in Studies 4 and 5, we performed Bayesian analyses. Our analyses revealed substantial evidence in 
favor of the null hypotheses for all moderating effects on implicit self-object linking in Study 4 (for Expectation of 
Ownership: BF0 =3.58, for Physical Ownership: BF0 = 5.66) and in Study 5 (for Expectation of Ownership: BF0 = 
5.04, for Time of Measurement: BF0 = 4.98).  
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ownership did not influence the magnitude of ownership effects on implicit self-object linking 
for negative objects. Nonetheless, we replicated the basic effect across all conditions, showing 
higher levels of implicit self-object linking regardless of whether participants did or did not 
expect ownership during pre-decision processing, and regardless of whether participants did or 
did not have physical ownership. In fact, our findings suggest that neither of the two factors is 
necessary to create self-object associations, in that we found choice effects on implicit self-object 
linking even when participants had no physical ownership, no expectation of ownership, and did 
not yet express a choice. Together, these findings suggest that pre-decision processing play a 
more important role than post-choice processing in the formation of self-object associations in 
ownership-by-choice situations involving negative objects.  
Implications for Associative Network Theories 
To our knowledge, the present research offers the first empirical test of the imbalance-
dissonance principle of the balanced identity theory (Cvencek et al., 2012; Greenwald et al., 
2002). The principle suggests that associative networks should resist forming a new association 
between two nodes that are each associated with one of two bipolar-opposed nodes. This 
principle has never been tested, possibly due to the difficulty in creating a situation that involves 
meaningful associations involving two bipolar-opposed concepts. The present research 
successfully addressed this difficulty by creating a mere-ownership situation with objects of 
negative valence which, for most people, is opposite to the positive valence of the self 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Koole et al., 2001). By doing so, the current studies provided  
direct empirical support for the imbalance-dissonance principle.  
Although many theories assume that the formation of new associations in memory is a 
slow process that requires repeated co-occurrences (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000), some 
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researchers have rejected this idea in the light of evidence that automatic responses on implicit 
measures can be acquired and changed relatively quickly on the basis of minimal experiences 
(e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). The present research expands on the latter 
hypothesis, showing that simple events such as ownership can influence mental associations in 
memory (see also Gawronski et al., 2007). From this perspective, our research provides valuable 
insights into how other, similar situations may influence mental associations.  
For example, one situation that involves a similarly trivial relation between a person and 
another entity is the minimal-group paradigm, in which participants are randomly assigned to a 
group on the basis of arbitrary, sometimes non-existent characteristics (Tajfel, 1970). Similar to 
the mere-ownership effect, the minimal-group effect is characterized by more favorable 
evaluations of the ingroup compared to the outgroup. Greenwald, Pickrell, and Farnham (2002) 
have argued that the minimal group effect is mediated by a mental association between the 
ingroup and the self. The present findings imply that these effects may be observed only when 
the ingroup is of positive valence and not when it is of negative valence (e.g., a stigmatized 
group). Moreover, when people can freely choose between groups to join, minimal-group effects 
may be observed even when the ingroup has a pre-existing negative valence. Future research 
may test these predictions to provide deeper insights into the associative underpinnings of 
ingroup favoritism.  
Implications for Decision-Making and Choice 
To our knowledge, the present research provides the first empirical examination of choice 
effects for decisions between two alternatives of negative valence (cf. Shultz & Lepper, 1996). 
An interesting question in this area is how valence of choice alternatives influences the 
processing of decision-relevant information. A decision between two positive alternatives may 
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involve a strategy of maximizing attractive features and a frame of maximizing gains, while a 
decision between two negative alternatives may involve a strategy of minimizing unattractive 
features and a frame of avoiding losses (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). In line with this idea, 
Fischer, Jonas, Frey, and Kastenmüller (2008) found that participants who had made a gain-
framed decision tended to engage in stronger post-decision information processing than those 
who had made a loss-framed decision. This finding is consistent with the present research, which 
found little evidence of post-decision processing affecting implicit self-object linking with 
negative choice alternatives.  
Our finding that neither choice expression nor physical ownership enhanced the effect of 
choice on implicit self-object linking seem particularly interesting in the context of online 
purchases on the internet, which inevitably involve a waiting period from the time of purchase to 
the time of physical ownership. The current research suggests that in-store purchases with 
immediate physical ownership do not necessarily have a psychological advantage over online 
purchases with delayed physical ownership in terms of the extent to which the purchased product 
becomes a part of the buyer’s self. Yet, our findings also indicate that physical ownership can 
enhance explicit evaluations. To our knowledge, there is no research to date that examined 
potential differences between online and in-store purchases in terms of their effects on 
consumers’ psychological experiences. Thus, in addition to its theoretical contribution, our 
research suggests some interesting directions for applied research in consumer psychology.   
Implications for Research on the Self  
The idea that owning an object can lead to changes in the content of one’s self-concept is 
in line with recent theories of self-representation, such as Wheeler, DeMarre, and Petty’s (2007) 
active-self model. Wheeler and colleagues suggest that, while the chronic representation of the 
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self includes all nodes associated with the self in the associative network, the active 
representation of the self includes only a subset of nodes that are currently accessible. They 
further suggest that the active representation of the self can be changed either by activating new 
content within the chronic representation of the self or by adopting new information from the 
environment. Together with these assumptions, our findings suggest that the process of 
introducing new material can be realized through ownership, which may add the owned object as 
a new component to the active representation of the self.  
These considerations help to answer an important question: What are the behavioral 
consequences of self-object associations? Wheeler et al.’s (2007) theory suggests that new 
content in the active representation of the self can have behavioral effects that are in line with the 
new content. Hence, the integration of an object into one’s active representation of the self may 
lead to an assimilation of one’s behavior to features of the owned object. Consistent with this 
idea, previous research by Fitzsimons et al. (2008) found that being primed with the logo of 
Apple increased both the motivation to be creative and actual creative behaviors. According to 
the active-self model, this prime-to-behavior effect is driven by the activation of the concept 
creative in one’s active self-concept, due to the exposure to the Apple logo. Based on the present 
research, it can be predicted that owning an Apple product may lead to similar outcomes, due to 
the formation of an association between the owner’s self and the owned product. Future research 
may further investigate the behavioral consequences of ownership, focusing particularly on the 
assimilation of behavior to certain features of the owned objects. 
Alternative Accounts  
De Houwer and colleagues recently proposed a single-process propositional model, 
which rejects the idea of associations as entities of mental representation (De Houwer, 2009, 
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2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). According to their model, social knowledge is 
stored in the form of propositions that capture relations between objects and events. Applied to 
the present research, one could argue that ownership effects on implicit self-object linking were 
mediated by propositions that were generated in response to the specific ownership situation (e.g., 
“I own this object” or “I chose this object”). We fully agree that the consideration of such 
propositions may contribute to the formation of self-object associations, as suggested by 
contemporary dual-process theories (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). However, 
we disagree with the ideas that such propositions (1) function as the proximal causes of implicit 
self-object liking independent of associative representations and (2) are necessary to produce the 
obtained effects on implicit self-object linking.  
In particular, the first hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with the finding that mere-
ownership influenced implicit self-object linking only for positive, but not for negative, objects. 
If ownership-related propositions function as proximal mediators of mere-ownership effects, 
they should occur regardless of whether the owned objects are positive or negative. The second 
hypothesis is inconsistent with our finding that neither physical ownership nor overt expression 
of a choice was necessary for the obtained effects on implicit self-object linking. These findings 
are difficult to reconcile with the idea that ownership- or choice-related propositions are 
necessary to produce the obtained effects on implicit self-object linking. Yet, they can be 
explained with the hypothesis that pre-decision processing increased self-object congruity for the 
chosen object and self-object incongruity for the rejected object, which should facilitate the 
formation of self-object associations for negative objects in ownership-by-choice situations.  
In his seminal work on the mere-ownership effect, Beggan (1992) suggested that 
ownership effects stem from the motivation to maintain a positive sense about self. According to 
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this account, the effects of ownership on implicit self-object linking might be a function of self-
enhancement motivation: stronger effects on self-object linking indicate higher levels of self-
enhancement motivation. This hypothesis seems difficult to reconcile with the present findings, 
showing mere-ownership effects on implicit evaluation and implicit self-object linking only for 
positive, but not negative, objects. If anything, self-enhancement motivation should lead to 
stronger ownership effects for negative compared to positive objects, given that ownership of 
negative objects may pose a threat to one’s positive self-views.  
Limitations 
Despite our conclusion that associative theories are superior in accounting for the 
obtained effects, it seems appropriate to acknowledge some limitations of the current studies. 
First, the use of the same materials (e.g., snake pictures) across all studies could limit the 
generalizability of our findings. It is also possible that our materials included unintended 
confounds, which may have contributed to the obtained results. For example, exposure to snake 
pictures could increase mortality salience (Koole & Van den Berg, 2005), which may elicit 
motivational processes that are different from the ones of regular negative objects (e.g., 
motivation to suppress death-related thoughts; see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). 
Thus, future research should aim to replicate the present findings with different types of objects. 
In order to provide further evidence for the generality of our findings, future research would also 
benefit from using dimensions other than valence (e.g., traits) for the manipulation of self-object 
congruity and incongruity.  
A key assumption in our research is that, for most people, the self is associated with 
positive valence (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Koole et al., 2001). Although implicit positivity 
toward the self has been found across cultures (Sedikides et al., 2015) and in 5-year-old children 
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(Cvencek et al., 2016), a more stringent test of our theory requires natural or experimentally 
induced variations in the valence of self. Future research addressing this issue may focus on 
individuals with chronic negative evaluations of the self (see Gawronski et al., 2007) or induce 
momentary negative evaluations of the self (e.g., Walther & Trasselli, 2003) with paradigms 
such as bogus failure feedback (Heatherton, Herman, & Polivy, 1991), memory retrieval (Peters 
& Gawronski, 2011), or priming (Wheeler et al., 2007).  
Another assumption we made is that changes in the levels of self-object congruity and 
self-object incongruity occur when desirable or undesirable features of the objects become 
salient during decision-related information processing (e.g., Tversky, 1972). Yet, other than the 
obtained effects on implicit self-object linking, the current studies do not provide direct evidence 
in support of this assumption. Thus, it is possible that changes in self-object congruity are 
mediated by other processes or representations. For example, decision-makers may form 
preferences on the basis of their gut feelings without thinking about specific features of the 
alternatives. Consequently, they may feel that they prefer one object without knowing the exact 
reasons behind their preference. In this case, changes in self-object congruity for the preferred 
alternative would be mediated by the positive feeling aroused during pre-decision processing 
instead of any specific features of this alternative. How decision-making changes mental 
representations of choice alternatives remains an empirical question that should be addressed in 
future research.  
Despite the observation of reliable ownership effects in ownership-by-choice situations, 
one may question whether the trivial nature of the choices in these situations (i.e., choosing 
between two postcards) limits the ecological validity of the present research (see Sherif & Sherif, 
1967). Although this concern may have contributed to the ineffectiveness of our manipulations in 
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Studies 4 and 5, it is worth noting that, even with such seemingly trivial choice tasks, reliable 
ownership effects have been observed in ownership-by-choice situations. Nonetheless, it remains 
an interesting question if increasing the significance of the choice options would moderate any of 
the present findings.  
Finally, a potential limitation is the relatively low internal consistencies of our IAT 
measures (Cronbach’s αs of .69, .71, .63, and .62 in Studies 2-5, respectively) as compared to 
those reported in previous research (e.g., Cronbach’s αs ranging from .7 to .9, Greenwald & 
Nosek, 2001; see also Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). Although it is possible that the lower 
internal consistencies are due to the use of a single target stimulus, instead of multiple stimuli, 
research by Steffens et al. (2008) found satisfactory internal consistencies using a similar 
procedure (Cronbach’s αs above .9). We suspect that the lower internal consistencies of our IAT 
measures might be due to the fact that we examined implicit self-object linking with novel 
objects, instead of implicit evaluations of relatively familiar categories (e.g., insect vs. flowers, 
minority groups, Greenwald et al., 1998). Yet, if anything, lower internal consistencies should 
reduce the sensitivity of the IAT to ownership effects, which stands in contrast the reliable 
ownership effects that have been observed in the current studies.  
Conclusions 
Ownership is one of the most fundamental concepts in social science. Yet, its significance 
for human behavior has often been overlooked in social psychology. In the present research, we 
took an associative approach to studying the psychological effects of ownership. Drawing on 
balanced-identity theory (Cvencek et al., 2012; Greenwald et al., 2002), we investigated the 
boundary conditions of ownership effects on implicit self-object linking in two ownership 
situations: mere-ownership and ownership-by-choice. Our findings have interesting implications 
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for a variety of research topics in social psychology and raised novel questions for future 
research. We hope that the present research illustrated the value of ownership research for other 
important topics in social psychology. After all, there is still much to learn on the psychology of 
human-object relations.  
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Table 1. Mean IAT scores reflecting ownership effects as a function of ownership expectation, 
physical ownership, and IAT block order, Study 4. 
Ownership 
Expectation 
Physical 
Ownership 
IAT Block Order 
Group Means 
Chosen object-self  
mapping in first 
combined block 
Chosen object-self  
mapping in second 
combined block 
Yes 
Yes 0.45 (0.38) 0.062 (0.28) 0.26 (0.37) 
No 0.56 (0.41) -0.16 (0.36) 0.20 (0.38) 
No 
Yes 0.41 (0.32) -0.15 (0.45) 0.13 (0.40) 
No 0.52 (0.31) -0.11 (0.44) 0.20 (0.38) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses depict standard deviations. Group means are unweighted and 
therefore not influenced by the unequal sample sizes between cells. Standard deviations for cell 
means are observed, but those for group means are estimated from mean squares.  
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations of IAT scores reflecting ownership effects as a function 
of ownership expectation, time of measurement and IAT block order, Study 5. 
Ownership 
Expectation 
Time of  
Measurement 
IAT Block Order 
Group Means 
Chosen object-self  
mapping in first 
combined block 
Chosen object-self 
mapping in second 
combined block 
Yes 
Before decision 0.50 (0.26) -0.06 (0.34) 0.22 (0.36) 
After decision 0.46 (0.38) -0.02 (0.31) 0.22 (0.36) 
No 
Before decision 0.58 (0.44) -0.04 (0.36) 0.27 (0.37) 
After decision 0.56 (0.39) -0.12 (0.37) 0.22 (0.36) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses depict standard deviations. Group means are unweighted and 
therefore not influenced by the unequal sample sizes between cells. Standard deviations for cell 
means are observed, but those for group means are estimated from mean squares. 
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Figure 1. The associative network of social knowledge. Adapted from “A Unified Theory of 
Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-esteem, and Self-concept,” by A. G. Greenwald, M. R. 
Banaji, L. A. Rudman, S. D. Farnham, B. A. Nosek, & D. S. Mellott, 2002, Psychological 
Review, 109, p. 5. Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association. 
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Figure 2. Graphical illustration of the balance-congruity principle. The formation of a new 
association between a person’s self and an object should be facilitated when they share 
associations to a common third node (i.e., positive valence).  
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Figure 3. Graphical illustration of the imbalance-dissonance principle. The formation of a new 
association between a person’s self and an object should be inhibited when each of the two nodes 
is associated to each of two bipolar-opposed nodes (i.e., positive and negative valence). 
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Figure 4. Implicit self-object linking (left panel) and implicit evaluations (right panel) as a function of mere-ownership (owned vs. 
non-owned) and object valence, Study 1. Error bars represent standard errors.  
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Figure 5. IAT scores of ownership effects on implicit self-object linking as a function of 
ownership situation (mere-ownership vs. ownership-by-choice), Study 2. Error bars represent 
standard errors.  
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Figure 6. IAT scores of ownership effects on implicit self-object linking as a function of time of 
measurement (pre-choice vs. post-choice), Study 3. Error bars represent standard errors.  
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Figure 7. Explicit evaluations of chosen and rejected objects as a function of physical ownership 
(with vs. without), Study 4. Error bars represent standard errors.  
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